From Preemption to Ordinary Care: Broker Liability After Montgomery

By: Omar Azam

For years, freight brokers have invoked the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA) as a powerful defense to state-law negligent-hiring and negligent-selection claims. The argument was straightforward: because a broker’s selection of a motor carrier relates to the broker’s transportation services, the claim is preempted by federal law. In some circuits, that defense ended broker-liability claims early, often before a single deposition took place. On May 14, 2026, however, the U.S. Supreme Court narrowed that path.

In Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, 608 U.S. ___, 146 S. Ct. 1199 (2026), the Court unanimously held that a state-law negligent-hiring claim against a freight broker falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception and, therefore, is not preempted. The decision resolved a circuit split (different federal appellate courts reaching different or opposite decisions) and shifts the focus of these cases away from threshold preemption motions and toward the merits of the broker’s carrier-selection process.

The Accident

Shawn Montgomery suffered severe injuries while stopped on the side of the road in Illinois, when a truck driven by Yosniel Varela-Mojena struck his tractor-trailer. Montgomery’s leg was amputated, and he sustained other serious and permanent injuries.

Varela-Mojena was driving for Caribe Transport II, LLC, a motor carrier. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., a freight broker, had arranged the shipment. Montgomery sued the driver, the carrier, and C.H. Robinson, alleging that C.H. Robinson negligently selected Caribe Transport despite information showing that the carrier had a “conditional” FMCSA safety rating and documented safety deficiencies involving driver qualification, hours of service, maintenance, and crash history.

The district court dismissed the negligent-hiring claim against C.H. Robinson as preempted by the FAAAA. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, relying on its prior decision in Ye v. GlobalTranz Enterprises, Inc. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether the FAAAA’s safety exception permits state-law negligent-hiring claims against freight brokers.

The Court’s Decision

Justice Barrett, writing for a unanimous Court, reversed. The Court assumed without deciding that the FAAAA’s express preemption provision would otherwise apply but held that the claim was saved by the Act’s safety exception.

The key statutory language provides that the FAAAA’s preemption provision “shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A). The Court read “with respect to” according to its ordinary meaning: “concerning” or “regarding.” Because a negligent-selection claim requires a broker to exercise reasonable care in choosing the carrier whose trucks will transport the load, the claim “concerns” motor vehicles and falls within the safety exception. Montgomery, 146 S. Ct. at 1204–05.

The Court explained carefully that the safety exception does not swallow FAAAA preemption entirely. State laws relating to prices, routes, and services that have no relationship to motor-vehicle safety remain preempted. But a claim alleging that a broker negligently selected an unsafe carrier to move freight by truck is different. That claim directly implicates motor-vehicle safety.

Justice Kavanaugh, joined by Justice Alito, concurred separately. He acknowledged that the case was closer than the majority opinion might suggest and recognized legitimate broker concerns about litigation costs, insurance, and uncertainty. But he ultimately agreed that Congress enacted the FAAAA to deregulate the economics of trucking, not to eliminate safety-based state tort claims against brokers while leaving motor carriers exposed to similar claims.

Practical Implications

This decision materially shifts the litigation landscape for everyone involved in the freight brokerage chain. The key takeaways:

1. Brokers no longer can rely on FAAAA preemption to defeat safety-based negligent-hiring claims at the pleadings stage. The defense that had been disposing of these claims in the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits since 2023 is no longer available for this category of case.
2. The focus now turns to ordinary care. Brokers must exercise reasonable care in selecting carriers, which may include reviewing publicly available FMCSA safety data, documenting the vetting process, and declining to use carriers with red-flag safety records.
3. Motor carriers with strong safety ratings are now better positioned competitively. Brokers have a greater incentive to select reputable, well-rated carriers, which may, over time, push lower-rated operators further to the margin.
4. Pending appeals, stayed cases, and non-final rulings may be affected. Just four days after Montgomery, the Fourth Circuit vacated a broker’s summary judgment and remanded, signaling that similar rulings may follow across the country. See Fuelling v. Echo Glob. Logistics, Inc., No. 25-1217, 2026 WL 1425091, at *1 (4th Cir., May 18, 2026).
5. Good-faith brokers are not automatic defendants. The Court and Justice Kavanaugh both recognized that brokers who act reasonably and select reputable carriers still should have strong defenses. Traditional tort requirements, including proximate cause, provide additional protection.

Looking Ahead

Montgomery is a significant decision for trucking and transportation litigants. It does not eliminate FAAAA preemption, and it does not impose automatic liability on freight brokers. But it does eliminate a major threshold defense to state-law negligent-selection claims involving motor-vehicle safety.

For brokers, the practical message is clear: carrier selection needs to be documented, defensible, and tied to a reasonable safety review. For motor carriers with strong safety records, the decision may create a competitive advantage. For litigants, the focus now will be less on whether the claim is preempted and more on whether the broker’s conduct was reasonable under the circumstances.

One issue remains unresolved. Justice Kavanaugh highlighted a statutory anomaly involving intrastate broker transportation under subsection (b) of the FAAAA, which lacks the same safety exception found in subsection (c). That asymmetry may generate future litigation or a legislative response.

For defense practitioners, Montgomery changes the battleground. The central questions now are factual: What did the broker know? What should it have known? Was the carrier’s safety record meaningfully deficient? Was the selection reasonable? And did the broker’s conduct actually cause the plaintiff’s injury?

Those questions are familiar territory in trucking litigation. Montgomery simply brings brokers more directly into that fight.