By: Stewart Milch and Kristina Taylor
Qualified Immunity for Private Healthcare Professionals (Part II)
In Part I of this article, we discussed when and how part-time government employees (specifically healthcare personnel) treating pretrial detainees or prisoners can use a qualified immunity defense against constitutional claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for allegedly negligent medical treatment. This article is focused on the growing criticisms of the qualified immunity doctrine and responses to those criticisms.
Recent Criticisms of the Qualified Immunity Doctrine
Recent questions and criticisms of the qualified immunity doctrine have come from Supreme Court Justices,[1] Courts of Appeals Judges,[2] and legal scholars.[3] One scholar—Professor Reinert of the Benjamin Cardozo School of Law—even believes the entirety of qualified immunity jurisprudence is wrong; that it is based on an incorrect version of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the original text purportedly rejected immunities for everyone.[4]
Appellate courts writing about the doctrine have generally criticized current precedents’ “diverge[ence] from the historical inquiry mandated by the statute.” Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 158.[5] That is, instead of analyzing cases with reference to whether 1871 common law would have afforded a privilege, courts have asked whether a government actor’s conduct “violates a clearly established statutory or constitutional right” a reasonable person would have known about. Id. at 159; see also Sosa v. Martin Cnty., Fla., 57 F.4th 1297, 1304 (11th Cir. 2023) (Jordan, J. concurring) (criticizing qualified immunity case law as “far removed from the principles existing in the early 1870s, when Congress enacted what is now 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”).
Scholarly criticism has focused primarily on the rationales underpinning the doctrine. Professor Baude, for instance, claims that history doesn’t support courts’ opinions holding that there were common-law exceptions for government actors when Section 1983 was adopted. This is like Professor Reinert’s argument that the real text of Section 1983 (as enacted in the 1871 Session Laws) contained language that effectively displaced all common-law defenses. According to Professor Reinert, “for reasons lost to history” that language never made it into the statute as codified in 1961. Judge Willett of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals seized on Professor Reinert’s opinions in Rogers, writing that the “lost words” are “game-changing,” and provide evidence that the current qualified immunity case law is “counter-textual.”[6]
Defending the Continued Application of Qualified Immunity
Not all legal scholars believe the doctrine should be abolished. Some—like Georgetown University Law Center Professor Elliott Averett—believe the criticisms are unpersuasive.[7] He specifically points out that Professor Reinert’s suggestion would effectively eliminate immunity for judges, legislators, and prosecutors, who are all absolutely immune from suit under Section 1983 in addition to those government workers—including healthcare employees—who have traditionally been given qualified immunity under existing precedent.[8]
Another frequent criticism Averett debunks is the claim that it allows police officers to “shoot first, think later.” But as Averett points out, trial courts often err against officers to find reasons not to dismiss civil rights claims under Section 1983. And abolishing qualified immunity could “hobble proactive policing[9] just when at-risk communities need it most, while making police recruiting and retention even more difficult….”[10]
Although there have been several recent critical scholarly articles urging elimination of the doctrine and some cases questioning it based on those articles, only the Supreme Court can abolish it.[11] And although Justice Thomas has written that he believes the doctrine should be re-examined, none of the Justices have indicated it should be abolished entirely. Even if the Supreme Court decided to re-examine the doctrine as Justice Thomas suggested, the Court has already performed the historical analysis he believes would be appropriate.[12] And the Fifth Circuit has followed.[13] And—to bring this back to the original content—that’s good news for healthcare professionals sued for civil rights violations under Section 1983, who can continue to take advantage of this defense
[1] See, e.g., Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 159-60 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring) (criticizing current qualified immunity case law as failing to interpret the intent of Congress when it enacted section 1983).
[2] Horvath v. City of Leander, 946 F.3d 787, 795 (5th Cir. 2020) (Ho, J., concurring in judgment in part, dissenting in part) (urging re-evaluation of qualified immunity precedent).
[3] See Alexander A. Reinert, Qualified Immunity’s Flawed Foundation, 111 Cal. L. Rev. 201 (2023) and William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 Cal. L. Rev. 45 (2018).
[4] Judge Willett of the Fifth Circuit has cited Professor Reinert’s article in urging re-examination of the doctrine. See Rogers v. Jarrett, 63 F.4th 971, 979 (5th Cir. 2023) (Willett, J., concurring) (citing Professor Reinert’s article, encouraging Supreme Court to re-examine its precedent in view of “lost text” discovery).
[5] About seven months after concurring in Ziglar and criticizing the Supreme Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence, Justice Thomas wrote for a unanimous Supreme Court in another qualified immunity case and, without comment, applied the rules he bemoaned. See District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62-63 (2018) (reversing order denying qualified immunity to police officers based on absence of “clearly established” law prohibiting their conduct).
[6] Rogers, 63 F.4th at 980.
[7] See Elliott Averett, An Unqualified Defense of Qualified Immunity, The Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 21:241] (2023).
[8] In the past three months alone, the Fifth Circuit has found that qualified immunity protected numerous officers, jailers, and municipalities from frivolous civil rights claims under Section 1983. See Winder v. Gallardo, 118 F. 4th 638 (5th Cir. 2024), Carvell v. Gibson, 2024 WL 4533312 (5th Cir. 2024), and Benfer v. City of Baytown, Texas, 120 F.4th 1272 (5th Cir. 2024).
[9] Although the qualified immunity defense arises most often in cases where police officers are accused of excessive force, as discussed in part one of this article it can be equally applicable to all government workers accused of civil rights violations under Section 1983.
[10] Averett, at 259.
[11] See Winder, 118 F.4th at 644 (intermediate appellate court may not abrogate Supreme Court authority on qualified immunity).
[12] See Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377 (2012) (analyzing immunities typically granted at common law in 1871).
[13] See Perniciaro v. Lea, 901 F.3d 241 (5th Cir. 2018) (acknowledging Filarsky’s “deep dive into the common law” to answer the question not present in previous cases).