By: William Allred and Omar Azam
In Werner Enterprises, Inc. v. Blake, 719 S.W.3d 525 (Tex. 2025), the Supreme Court of Texas reversed a nearly $100 million verdict arising from a tragic winter highway collision and clarified an important limitation on negligence liability: proximate cause still matters. For defendants and insurers alike, the decision represents a significant development in how courts evaluate causation when an accident is set in motion by forces outside a defendant’s control.
The Accident
The case arose from a devastating crash during icy conditions on a Texas interstate. On December 30, 2014, Trey Salinas was driving a vehicle with four passengers (Jennifer Blake and her three children). Plaintiffs were traveling eastbound on I-20 near Odessa, Texas. Temperatures were below freezing, with sleet and hazardous driving conditions.
At approximately 4:30 p.m., Salinas lost control of his vehicle while driving 50-60 miles per hour. In a matter of seconds, Salinas crossed the 42-foot grassy median and entered westbound I-20, colliding with a Werner Enterprises 18-wheeler driven by Shiraz Ali. Ali was driving approximately 50 miles per hour and braked as hard as possible but was unable to avoid the collision. The crash killed one of Blake’s children and severely injured the remaining occupants.
At trial, the plaintiffs argued that Werner’s driver should not have been operating his truck at the speed he was traveling given the weather conditions. A jury ultimately returned a massive verdict against Werner and its driver. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals in Houston, sitting en banc, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. But the Supreme Court of Texas saw the issue differently.
The Court’s Focus: Proximate Cause Still Matters
The central issue before the Court was whether Ali’s conduct could legally be considered a proximate cause of the collision. The Court noted that “[b]y answering “yes” to the question about Ali’s liability, the jury found that Ali’s negligence was a substantial factor in bringing about the Blakes’ injuries. To overcome that finding on appeal, the defendants must demonstrate that no reasonable juror could have found so.” Werner, 719 S.W.3d at 533. In this regard, the Court held that:
We conclude the defendants have made this demanding showing. The jury charge distinguished between but-for causation and substantial-factor causation and required the jury to find both. Given a proper understanding of substantial-factor causation—an understanding consistent with the jury charge given in this case—no reasonable juror could assign responsibility for these injuries to anyone other than the driver who lost control of his vehicle and hurtled across a 42-foot median onto oncoming highway traffic, thereby causing this accident and these injuries in every legally relevant sense of the word.
Id.
The Court’s opinion reinforces that Texas law requires both cause-in-fact (both substantial factor causation and but-for causation) and foreseeability. “Substantial” factor connotes responsibility. The question is whether, given the nature of the defendant’s causal connection to the accident, it is reasonable to conclude that he is “actually responsible for the ultimate harm.” If, on the other hand, the defendant’s conduct “merely creates the condition that makes the harm possible, it is not a substantial factor in causing the harm, as a matter of law.”
The ruling underscores a principle that defense lawyers frequently emphasize but juries sometimes overlook: negligence alone is not enough. The negligence must be a substantial factor in bringing about the injury.
The Court Declines to Adopt the “Admission Rule”
Beyond proximate cause, the case also presented an opportunity for the Court to address a doctrinal issue that has divided courts across the country: the so-called “Admission Rule.”
In many jurisdictions, once an employer admits that an employee was acting within the course and scope of employment, plaintiffs are barred from pursuing separate theories such as negligent hiring, training, supervision, or entrustment. Courts adopting the rule reason that those claims become redundant because the employer’s vicarious liability is already established. The Court in Werner declined the defendants’ invitation to adopt the rule in this case.
Instead, the Court left intact Texas practice allowing plaintiffs to simultaneously pursue both direct negligence claims and vicarious liability theories. While the Court acknowledged the arguments behind the rule, it ultimately concluded that the issue did not need to be resolved to decide the case.
For practitioners, this portion of the opinion may be as significant as the proximate-cause holding. Interestingly, the Texas Legislature already addressed some of these concerns.
The Texas Twist: Chapter 72 Bifurcation
As mentioned, Texas already addressed some of the policy concerns underlying the Admission Rule through legislation.
Under Chapter 72 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code, a defendant employer may move to bifurcate trial after stipulating that the employee was acting within the course and scope of employment, allowing the jury to first determine the employee’s liability before any direct negligence claims against the employer are considered. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 72.052, 72.054.
If granted, the jury first determines liability for the underlying negligence claim. Evidence relating to negligent hiring, supervision, or similar theories is withheld unless the plaintiff prevails in the first phase. In practice, Chapter 72 provides a procedural mechanism that can reduce the risk of undue prejudice while still preserving the plaintiff’s ability to pursue direct negligence claims if necessary.
The existence of Chapter 72 also may explain why the Court declined to adopt the Admission Rule outright. In many respects, Chapter 72 addresses the policy concerns that motivate the Admission Rule in other jurisdictions. By allowing bifurcation once an employer admits course and scope, Texas law limits the risk that evidence relating to hiring practices or corporate policies will unfairly prejudice the jury’s liability determination.
Practical Implications for Trucking and Catastrophic Injury Litigation
The Werner decision carries several lessons for litigants:
1. Proximate cause remains a powerful defense.
Even in catastrophic cases with sympathetic facts, courts will scrutinize whether the defendant’s conduct actually caused the injury.
2. Independent forces still matter.
When an accident is triggered by weather, roadway conditions, or another driver’s loss of control, liability may not extend to a party who simply could not avoid the collision.
3. The Admission Rule remains unresolved in Texas.
Plaintiffs may continue pleading negligent hiring and similar claims alongside respondeat superior theories.
4. Chapter 72 will likely become more important.
Defendants should evaluate whether seeking bifurcation early in the case could limit prejudicial evidence and streamline the trial.
Looking Ahead
Although the Court in Werner declined to formally adopt the Admission Rule, the issue is unlikely to disappear. As trucking cases continue to generate large verdicts, defendants will likely continue asking Texas courts to reconsider the doctrine. For now, defendants may look to Chapter 72 for some assistance. Nonetheless, Werner stands as a significant reminder that, even in tragic and emotionally charged cases, liability still must rest on legally sufficient proof of causation.